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Render Copyright unto Caesar: 
On Taking Incentives Seriously 
Wendy J. Gordont 
This Essay suggests we bifurcate our thinking. Conventional 
copyright rules by money, so let it rule the money-bound. Let a differ-
ent set of rules evolve for more complex uses, particularly when the 
users have a personal relationship with the utilized text. Much recent 
scholarship contains dramatic suggestions to secure a freedom to be 
creative, rewrite, and be imaginative. My work has long sought to de-
fend such freedoms, but I believe we understand imagination and its 
conditions too little to employ it as a starting point. I suggest instead 
that we acquire a better conceptual map of the generative process and 
the mix of incentives that serve it. 
In particular, this Essay asks us to consider the role of free re-
ceipt. An example may be found in the Talmud, which tells of a carob 
tree being planted by an old man who would not live to eat its fruit. 
When a passerby expressed surprise, the old man replied, "I found 
[ready grown] carob trees in the world; as my forefathers planted 
these for me so I too plant these for my children."' 
The perception that one has received a gift can stir a desire to 
give gifts of one's own. Out of this desire, one creates, and the recipro-
cal creation starts a new cycle of generativity. Moreover, one may ex-
perience the free receipt of anything that one has not created as if it 
were a gift, whether or not there was an actual willing donor. Copy-
right scholars need to consider whether the current expansion in 
copyright-an expansion that requires new authors to pay for an ever 
larger proportion of the expression they receive and use-might have 
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a previously under-recognized cost, namely, muffling the emotions of 
free receipt that might otherwise stimulate generative activity. 
Gratitude is not the only explanation of why unearned receipt 
can spur one's own efforts. Resentment and the desire to throw off the 
discomfort of a perceived obligation may also suffice, as might a wish 
to compete with the giver for status or power, or a wish to secure an 
unearned gift by deserving it. Despite the remarkable variation in eti-
ology ascribed to the phenomenon, a growing consensus in literary 
theory,2 behavioral psychology;' and anthropology• suggests that one 
reaction to costless receipt is a corresponding desire to give, share, or 
produce something of equivalent or greater value. 
Such an urge may be insufficient to provide a living for those who 
produce art or software. For one thing, reciprocation is not the only 
form that the reaction can take. Instead, like the planter of the carob 
tree, the recipient of bounty may choose to pay the debt "forward." 
Leaving the source of the bounty uncompensated is sometimes mor-
ally improper, and sometimes imprudent from the perspective of pro-
viding efficient incentives.5 
Yet morality is not always offended when beneficial acts go less 
than fully rewarded, and incentives are not always and inevitably at 
risk when a positive externality goes un-internalized. This Essay ar-
gues that, as to the potential borrowers most likely to be affected by 
the emotions of free receipt, neither morality nor economics requires 
2 See, for example, Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property 
(Vintage 1983) (arguing that authorial production often results from gratitude); Harold Bloom, 
The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry xiii (Oxford 2d ed 1997) (claiming that authorial 
production often results from a desire to cast off perceived burdens from the past). 
3 See, for example, Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels. ERC: A Theory of Equity, Recip-
rocity, and Competition, 90 Am Econ Rev 166 (2000) (explaining how perceived equity, reciproc-
ity, and competition factor into decisionmaking via actors' pecuniary payoffs and their relative 
payoff standing); Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Co-
operation, 114 Q J Econ 817 (1999) (arguing that economic environment determines whether 
fairness considerations or purely selfish motives dominate equilibrium behavior). The introduc-
tion of money, for example, can sometimes change preferences or behavior in a way that remains 
even when the money is thereafter removed. See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini. A Fine Is a 
Price, 29 J Legal Stud 1, 14 (2000). 
Suggestions for explaining the observed phenomena differ widely. See, for example, Jeroen 
van de Ven, The Economics of the Gift (CentER Discussion Working Paper No 2000-68, July 
2000), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=244683 (visited Nov 15, 2003) (discussing different mo-
tivations for giving); Gary Charness and Ernan Haruvy, Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a 
Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach, 40 Games & Econ Beh 203 (2002). 
4 Because of the desire to reciprocate. gift-giving can function as a form of exchange; nev-
ertheless it often does not involve immediate reciprocity. For a useful overview, see C.A. Greg-
ory, Gifts, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds. 2 The New Pa/grave: A Dic-
tionary of Economics 524 (Macmillan 1987). For a classic treatment, see Marcel Mauss. The Gift: 
The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (Routledge 1990) (W.D. Halls. trans). 
5 This Essay does not argue that monetary incentives are unnecessary to encourage crea-
tion. Its point rather is that we need to identify the optimal mix of monetary and nonmonetary 
incentives for various contexts within the cultural industries. 
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the imposition of a duty to refrain from copying. It therefore urges 
that we turn to investigating how monetary and nonmonetary models 
interact in calling forth new work.6 
Part I discusses the gifts all artists receive, namely, a tradition and 
world they have not made. Part II argues that neither morality nor 
economics rules out consideration of free receipt. This Part draws on 
John Locke's intuition that property owners have moral obligations 
arising out of mutually received gift-obligations that should limit 
copyright owners' ability to restrain others-and suggests that the 
economic justifications for copyright are similarly limited. Part III 
casts a cautionary eye on attempts to increase the role of liability-rule 
remedies in copyright; Part IV suggests possible rules that might be 
implemented if the costs of commodification prove sufficiently sub-
stantial. Throughout, this Essay proposes areas for further research. 
I. TRADITION AS GIFT 
Consider the middle quatrain of Shakespeare's Sonnet 87: 
For how do I hold thee but by thy granting, 
And for that riches where is my deserving? 
The cause of this fair gift in me is wanting, 
And so my patent back again is swerving. 1 
Written as to a deserting lover, "Sonnet 87 (not by design) also 
can be read as an allegory of any writer's (or person's) relation to tra-
dition."" We receive images, tales, language, and structure from the 
past. As co-inheritors, any recipient may claim equality against the 
other recipients. But because the "fair gift" was given in excess of our 
desert, we hold it insecurely. A writer's sense of insecurity might be 
fruitful. But this insecurity might be eliminated or muted if the receiv-
ing author (Shakespeare in this case) had paid for a license, as would 
probably be required under today's copyright law." 
In prior work, I have used economics and notions of just desert to 
argue that our current law imposes too many prohibitions on borrow-
° For example, in some contexts a small payment extinguishes intrinsic motivation without 
itself inducing effort, while a large payment may more than compensate for the extinction vel 
non of the intrinsic motive. See. for example, Ernst Fehr and Simon Giichter. Fairness and Re-
taliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J Econ Persp 159. 170-72 (2000); Uri Gneezy and 
Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don •t Pay At All. 115 Q J Econ 791 (2000). 
7 William Shakespeare. Sonnet 87. in Stanley Wells. ed. Shakespeare's Sonnets and a 
Lover's Complaint IOI (Oxford 1985) (emphases added). 
x Bloom, Anxiety of Influence at xiii (cited in note 2). 
9 See Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature 397-99 (Harvard rev ed 1998) (concluding 
that there is a strong probability that Shakespeare "would have been guilty of infringement'" un-
der modern standards). 
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ing."' Here I suggest that imposing a duty to pay for use might in par-
ticular be inappropriate for a subclass of potential defendants: namely, 
persons who are peculiarly well placed to be motivated by perceptions 
of gift because they have a personal relationship to the text. 
II. THE LOCKEAN CONCEPTION OF 
G IIT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
All artists create using much they have not themselves created, 
both in terms of physical and human surroundings and in terms of cul-
tural heritage. The holders of a common cultural tradition resemble 
the inhabitants of Locke's state of nature: their riches are largely not 
of their own making. 
An artist's relationship to her tradition sometimes involves quo-
tation and imitation in ways that implicate copyright law. That law in-
sufficiently recognizes that, because predecessors also built on tradi-
tion, the claims that they can rightfully assert against the makers of 
later art should be limited. Current copyright law understates those 
limits, largely because the law conceives of the "public domain" as an 
area free of obligations. Under current law, anyone can copy from the 
public domain, and claim copyright in what he has added, regardless 
of whether doing so will impair others' use of the underlying domain 
that all inherited together. John Locke's position was different. 
Believing that "God ... has given the Earth to the Children of 
Men, given it to Mankind in common," 11 Locke treated free access to 
the common as something that must be given priority over honoring 
an individual's claim to the fruits of her labor. When someone em-
ploys her labor to make the land or its fruits useful, she has a private 
claim over the result only provided she leaves "enough, and as good" 
for others. 12 The proviso requiring "enough, and as good" reflects a 
moral intuition regarding what we undeservedly receive: when we 
reap what we have not sown, we have a duty not to shrink the shares 
to See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold 
for Dross, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 159 (2002) (arguing that existing copyright terms are economi-
cally unjustified); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of /ntellect11al Property, 102 Yale L J 1533 (1993). 
11 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government § 25, in Two Treatises of Government 
265, 286 (Cambridge 1988) (Peter Laslett, ed). 
12 Locke argued that unanimous consent was not required before one co-owner appropri-
ated. Any other co-owner who complained about the appropriation in circumstances where the 
complainer had "as good" available was merely "covetous" and "quarrelsome": 
He that had as good left for his Improvement, as was already taken up, needed not com-
plain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's Labour: If he did, 
'tis plain he desired the benefit of another's Pains. which he had no right to, and not the 
Ground which God had given him in common .... 
Id § 34 at 291. 
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of those whose gosition is the same as ours. This was part of Locke's 
generally assumed obligation not to do harm.', 
Although many have argued that private ownership of land vio-
lates the Lockean proviso, ownership of property other than land has 
appeared by contrast an easy case to justify. Thus, John Stuart Mill 
wrote: 
It is no hardship to any one to be excluded from what others 
have produced: ... he loses nothing by not sharing in what oth-
erwise would not have existed at all." 
Because intellectual property can be used by many simultane-
ously, satisfying the proviso seems even easier for copyright claimants. 
That is not the case. An author who claims copyright in what she in-
termixes with the common sometimes can in fact do harm, including 
harm to others' use of the pre-existing material. I argue that borrow-
ing is often justified to avoid or mitigate these harms." But before ex-
ploring the resulting liberties, it would be useful to identify the narrow 
compass within which the obligation to avoid harm and the claim to 
private ownership can coexist compatibly. 
A. When a Duty to Refrain from Use of Others' Work Can 
Justifiably Be Imposed 
1. Using another's efforts as a mere means to one's own ends: 
the instrumentalist user. 
This Essay distinguishes between two types of uses that can be 
made of predecessor work. In one class belongs the copying by an art-
ist/user who uses a pre-existing work simply to save effort and ex-
pense, as a fungible instrument. In the second class belongs the copy-
ing by any artist/user who has been affected by the prior work in some 
way other than a simple stimulated desire for "more." Copyright 
sweeps everybody into its reach, but it is the first group, whom I call 
"instrumental" users, who stand as the proper target at copyright's 
conceptual core.'• These persons aim to take for their own use benefits 
13 See Gordon, 102 Yale L J at 1540-48 (cited in note 10) (arguing that a prohibition 
against doing harm stands as the primary basis of the Lockean right to property and the proviso 
that limits it). 
14 John Stuart Mill, 2 Principles of Political Economy ch II, § 6 at 233 (Longmans, Green 
1926) (W.J. Ashley, ed). 
15 Note that I make no argument for a right of action against the person whose speech 
causes harm. Rather, I am suggesting a liberty for the harmed person to engage in "more 
speech." 
In By copyright's core, I mean the structure in which a private party's right to stop others 
from copying her work is most justified. Whether real fact patterns exist that match such a core is 
a separate issue. We need to understand the central, idealized model, where everything fits, be-
fore moving to reality. 
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toward which the author had labored, not because oi a personal rela-
tionship between the user and the copied creation, but simply because 
using the creation facilitates the user's other ends. In relation to the 
text, such persons are as close to purely self-interested economic ac-
tors as can be imagined. In Locke's words, the instrumentalist is the 
person who "desired the benefit of another's Pains which he had no 
right to, and not the Ground"" that was the common gift. 
Preventing an instrumentalist from using the work for his own 
profit makes him no worse off than if the pre-existing work had never 
come to his notice. Excluding instrumentalists from the laborer's 
product still leaves them with "enough, and as good" as the laborer 
herself possessed. Denying them use of a work or making them pay 
for it simply restores them to their status quo ante, the classic function 
of corrective justice. 
2. Harm to the first author's plans. 
Unlimited liability is not morally proper even against the instru-
mentalist user. In the Lockean system, an owner's rights are limited 
not only by the proviso, but also by the condition that the claimant 
must have "labored" to produce the thing over which exclusivity is 
claimed. Laboring is a purposive notion.'" The liability of instrumental-
ist users is therefore defined not only with reference to their motive, 
but also with reference to the result of how that motive is pursued: the 
harmful effect on the laboring author. 
Sometimes, incidental to her primary activity, a laborer produces 
beneficial effects that spill over into other areas. It is difficult to see 
moral reasons for condemning a third party (even an instrumentalist 
user) for making productive use of the spillover. The behavior of in-
Early American copyright statutes did not reach far beyond instrumental users. but copy-
right law has drastically expanded since the 1790s. Thus. cases like Folsom v Marsh, 9 F Cas 342, 
344-45 (CCD Mass 1841), confirmed that most transformative uses were not infringing; today, 
the fair use doctrine is the primary remnant of the broad privilege early copyright gave the pub-
lic to make transformative uses. For the history, see Pierre Leval, Nimmer Lee/lire: Fair Use Res-
cued, 44 UCLA L Rev 1449, 1451-53 (1997). 
17 Locke, Second Treatise§ 34 at 291 (cited in note 11). 
18 Lawrence Becker argues that purpose is essential to the notion of "labor," for one "la-
bors toward" a particular goal. See Lawrence Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 
48-50 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977). A similar constraint can be seen in notions of corrective 
justice. When an infringer usurps the copyright owner's intended market, justice is achieved by 
simultaneously removing the unjustified gain from the defendant and restoring it to the plaintiff. 
Both are restored to the status quo ante. Consider Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 84--86 (D. 
Reidel 1975) (Hippocrates G. Apostle, trans); Ernest J. Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms of Justice, 2 Ra-
tio Juris 211 (1989). A much more ambiguous status applies to a person who benefits from an-
other's efforts without interfering with the goals toward which the laborer had worked. For ex-
ploration of this point in regard to intellectual property, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning In-
formation: lntelleclllal Property and the Restitlllionary Impulse, 78 Va L Rev 149. 238-48 (1992). 
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strumentally motivated users has a clearly wrongful quality only inso-
far as it interferes with the plans of the laboring author." 
A focus on harm to the plaintiffs expected plans is also central to 
the standard economic justification of copyright. This justification pro-
ceeds as follows: without a duty to obtain licenses, copyists could sell 
at a price that does not cover the cost of creation; if copying is cheap 
and consumers would accept the unauthorized copies as exact substi-
tutes, copyists could arise who would drive authors or their royalty-
paying publishers into debt; the fear of this possibility causes a de-
crease in creative incentives; to avoid this decrease in incentives, copy-
right is instituted. This argument takes the form of a prisoner's di-
lemma game.20 When the copyist does not interfere with the expected 
market of the author or her authorized publisher, there is no pris-
oner's dilemma. 
In sum, the instrumentalist is someone who has not been affected 
by the work's content. Barring his use (or requiring him to pay a li-
cense fee tied to the revenue he anticipates) would not impose a net 
harm on him. From a moral and economic perspective, he should re-
frain from copying that interferes with the laborer's plans, and Locke's 
logic justifies making him subject to suit when he violates that duty. 
B. When There Is No Duty to Refrain from Use 
Beyond instrumentalist users, there is a second group, defined by 
having a connection with the work itself. Because they do not merely 
seek the "benefit of another's Pains," the proviso is unlikely to be sat-
isfied when suit is brought against them. Such persons may be entitled 
to some freedom to borrow even when their use interferes with the 
original author's plans.21 To such a "content-oriented user," the text is 
not just a commodity, an instrument, or a tool that can be exchanged 
with other tools. Such a user has an emotional reaction to the text that 
19 Admittedly, an authorial laborer can adopt a broad conception of her plans. (For exam-
ple, "I envisage production of my work in all media in all languages on all planets with all ac-
companiments and all variations possible, forever.") At some point a normative choice must 
identify the interests in which the author has a stake significant enough to warrant protection 
from injury. 
20 The copyright version of the prisoner's dilemma game goes something like this: "To co-
operate" means "to invest in creating new writings." (For example, one could "cooperate" by in-
vesting one's own time in creating a writing, or by paying royalties to someone else who has de-
voted her efforts to such a project.) "To defect" means "to publish work created by others with-
out paying them." Defenders of intellectual property argue that without copyright, people will 
avoid becoming authors or royalty-paying publishers lest they become the "cullies" of nonpaying 
copyists who will capture the market by charging a lower price. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, 
lntel/ectual Property Law, in Peter Crane and Mark Tushnet, eds, Oxford Handbook of Legal 
St1tdies 617 (Oxford 2003). 
21 I am assuming a "use" such as copying here. not destruction or alteration. 
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is nonfungible. The need to react to the text may involve use of the 
text; suppressing the need will violate the proviso. 
I do not contend that enforcing copyright will always suppress or 
distort the borrower's creative impulse. If the second-generation au-
thor can effectively use the work by paying, and if paying does not in-
terfere with her expressive use, then from the perspective of the pro-
viso she is like an instrumentalist and must pay. If however paying 
does interfere, then the proviso is implicated. 
Lewis Hyde and others have forcefully argued that calculation 
can indeed interfere with artists making new work;22 David Lange has 
argued that it can interfere with audiences enjoying and integrating 
others' works.2"' If so, the content-oriented user is left with two choices. 
Either one- refraining from the expressive use, or paying in a way 
that affects the expressive use-leaves the content-oriented user 
without "enough" in the sense of "ability to use her experience for 
art." It also leaves her without "as good" to the extent that at some 
prior temporal point, more such freedom was available. 
Some content-oriented users should be restrained by law; some 
should not. Among those whom the law should not restrain from using 
predecessor art are those new authors whose perceptions have been 
deeply and negatively affected by encountering the predecessor work. 
An example is Alice Randall, author of The Wind Done Gone,2• an 
Afro-centric critical sequel to Gone with the Wind" that was, for a 
while, banned from store shelves for copyright infringement.2• Randall 
stated that she would rather have been "born blind'"1 than have read 
Gone with the Wind. Such an author's position in life has been nega-
tively affected by the predecessor work. To forbid Randall the tools 
necessary to deal fully with the change can make her worse off than if 
she had never encountered the work at all. 
In some ways, her situation resembles the position of a reliance 
party in promissory estoppel. In both cases, the law may limit the 
freedom of the actor who had reason to realize that the other party 
will likely come to change position: like some promisors, the first au-
thor communicates words that will infiltrate and change the percep-
22 See, for example, Hyde, The Gift at 152 (cited in note 2). 
23 David Lange, The Public Domain: Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L & Contemp 
Probs 463 (2003). 
24 Alice Randall, The Wind Done Gone (Houghton Mifflin 2001). 
25 Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind (Scribner 1936). 
26 See SunTrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 136 F Supp 2d 1357 (ND Ga 2001) (enjoin-
ing production, display, distribution. advertising, sale. or offer for sale of the book The Wind 
Done Gone), revd, 268 F3d 1237 (11th Cir 2001) and 252 F3d 1165 (11th Cir 2001). 
27 Alice Randall, Interview. The Connection (July 16. 2001), online at http:// 
archives.theconnection.org/archive/2001/07/0716b.shtml. Randall's hyperbole does not obscure 
the underlying statement: integrating Gone with the Wind into her life was something that hurt. 
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tions and perhaps the behavior of the recipient. Once the text or 
promise has been proffered and has been foreseeably relied on, the 
precise intent of the person authoring the text or promise becomes 
less important: arguments of fairness come into play against allowing 
the author of the text or promise to withdraw it at whim.'" Just as 
sometimes a gratuitous promisor must pay to avoid harming a relying 
promisee, an author must sometimes allow some use to avoid harming 
the affected readers. 
Barring audiences from using the works they encounter can leave 
them without a key condition needed for their own creative expres-
sion. Before the invention of copyright, authors possessed freedom'9 to 
use all the world around them (including those portions of the world 
authored by others). The institution of copyright risks leaving a new 
creator without "enough, and as good" access to the material of her 
life. 
One can sketch a rough continuum to describe the many utilizers 
whose motives are not solely instrumental and whose economic ef-
fects are not purely substitutive. At one pole are the authors like Alice 
Randall, who should be empowered to use the prior work by a self-
defense privilege based on a kind of reliance. Thus, I argue that these 
are persons against whom the laborer has no perfected property right, 
for the product of the labor did her harm. If her self-help to undo the 
harm requires use of the property, the Lockean proviso would allow 
such use. Even some litigated cases have recognized such self-defense 
as legitimately privileged; against harmful speech it is legitimate to use 
"more speech" even when that involves copying."" 
28 An alternative analogy is the privilege of "self-defense": the second author (recipient) 
should be able to use the donor's work in order to defeat its harmful effects. See Gordon, 102 
Yale L J at 1603 (cited in note 10). See also Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law 
of Fair Use: Commodifica1ion and Markel Perspeclives, in Niva Elkin-Koren and Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, eds, The Commodifica1ion of lnformalion 149, 171-72 (Kluwer Law 2002). See also 
note 30. 
29 I do not mean to overstate. In the 1600s there was no copyright, but freedom was not full 
either-censorship abounded. See, for example, Censorship, in Shakespeare's Life and Times, 
online at http://web.uvic.ca/shakespeare/Library/SLTnoframes/literature/censorship.html (visited 
Jan 13, 2004) (discussing censorship in England during the Elizabethan age). 
30 Jerry Falwell, as part of a fundraising effort, sent his supporters photocopies of a copy-
righted Hustler magazine attack on him. The Ninth Circuit wrote: 
(A)n individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about 
himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable com-
ment. Falwell did not use more than was reasonably necessary to make an understandable 
comment when he copied the entire parody from the magazine .... (T)he public interest in 
allowing an individual to defend himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to 
rebut the presumption of unfairness. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc v Moral Majori1y, Inc, 796 F2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir 1986). Thus, although 
the First Amendment barred Falwell from suing Hustler for the emotional damage the attack 
caused him, see Husller Magazine, Inc v Falwell, 485 US 46 (1988), the First Amendment did not 
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Close to this group are the new artists whose encounter with the 
predecessor work was not harmful, but who have integrated the prior 
work into themselves. They are not sufficiently protected by copy-
right's dichotomy between owned "expression" and publicly usable 
"ideas.',." Thus, James Joyce deeply questioned "copyright's notion that 
ideas and facts are anterior to their particular expressions, and thus 
separable, yielding to paraphrase, transmissible without either disfig-
urement or infringement."" Prohibiting someone from using others' 
expression-as copyright does-can divide the enjoined person from 
a part of herself." 
To illustrate these users, let us begin with the poet Stephen 
Spender. He writes: 
Paul Valery speaks of the "une ligne donnee" [a line that is given] 
of a poem. One line is given to the poet by God or by nature, the 
rest he has to discover for himself. 
My own experience of inspiration is certainly that of a line or a 
phrase or a word or sometimes something still vague, a dim cloud 
of an idea which I feel must be condensed into a shower of words . 
. . . It occurs in what seems to be an active, male, germinal form·"' 
as though it were the centre of a statement requiring a beginning 
and an end, and as though it had an impulse in a certain direc-
tion:" 
What is most interesting for copyright purposes occurs when the 
ligne donnee comes from another's work. For example, artist J.S.G. 
Boggs writes: 
Creative people are prisoners. That is to say, that they get "cap-
tured," and the only way out is to beat a path away from the 
point of captivity. If my attention is "captured," it is impossible to 
simply get away. The bars are not physical. They are produced by 
the intellectual, the emotional, or, more unusually, a combination 
bar the court from giving Falwell a "self-help privilege" of self-defense assertable under the label 
of fair use. 
31 See 17 USC§ 102(b) (2000) (stating that copyright does not extend to ideas). 
32 Paul K. Saint-Amour, The Copywrights: Intellectual Property and the Literary Imagina-
tion 189 (Cornell 2003) (discussing the "Oxen of the Sun" episode in Ulysses). 
33 See generally Wendy J. Gordon and Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 
Yale J L & Humanities 135 (1998) (arguing that one reason for placing ideas in the public do-
main is to guard against persons receiving parts of themselves pre-alienated). 
34 Let us forgive Spender his gender bias; after all, a woman poet in the same circum-
stances could probably talk about the pressure a gravid mother feels when a child is being born. 
35 Stephen Spender, The Making of a Poem, in Brewster Ghiselin, ed, The Creative Process: 
A Symposium 112, 118 (Mentor 1952) (emphasis added). 
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of the two. But, they are as functional as any jail cell ever con-
structed in the material world."" 
T.S. Eliot thought that the work of a poet was "to capture those 
feelings which people can hardly even feel, because they have no words 
for them."-" But even as to a free man, capable of expressing himself 
fully without need to quote, allowing one poet the privilege of quota-
tion without the need for potentially painful negotiation helps the 
public greatly without much harming the person quoted. With such 
transformative use, there is no prisoner's dilemma. An example of 
pure benefit that should nevertheless be allowed is Bob Dylan's fre-
quent but trivial borrowings in his album, Love and Death, from the 
English translation of a Japanese book."" One suspects that these bits 
and pieces would have drifted out of Dylan's mind in a day or two-so 
that they did not significantly imprison him. Nevertheless, in a day or 
two other fragments of received culture would probably have taken 
their place. To sift these out may interfere with the creative process; to 
deny the book's copyright holder a right to sue would probably cause 
more gain than loss to society." 
Such freedom from copyright is also likely to benefit authors in 
the long run, as evidenced by the long tradition among fine artists and 
composers of tolerating each other's uses. More documentation of 
these customs and their limits is needed, but we can preliminarily 
speculate that this form of gift allowed artists to use each other's work 
under a custom of tolerance that served their mutual self-interest. 
Now that copyright terms typically endure seventy years beyond 
the life of the author, that custom of gift may alter. That does not 
mean that generosity toward borrowing has ceased to serve authors' 
interests; rather, copyright term extension has changed the players. 
36 J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 Chi Kent L Rev 889, 889 (1993). A conceptual artist, 
Boggs creates portraits of dollar bills. 
37 T.S. Eliot, What Dante Means to Me, in Peter S. Hawkins and Rachel Jacoff, eds, The 
Poet's Dante 28, 38 (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux 2001) (emphasis added). Eliot himself often 
"borrowed lines" from Dante, "to arouse in the reader's mind the memory of some Dantesque 
scene, and thus establish a relationship between the medieval inferno and modern life." Id at 31. 
38 See Jonathan Eig, Did Bob Dylan Lift Lines from Dr. Saga? Author Is Flattered, Wall St 
J Al (July 8, 2003). 
39 This argues that some socially desirable uses-beyond those privileged by Locke's pro-
viso not being met-require freedom from copyright to occur. The justification here sounds pri-
marily in consequentialist welfarist arguments, rather than in natural law. It could sound in natu-
ral law as well, if the rights lost by the initial laborer are fungible with other gains the copyright 
system gives her. I have argued that since current copyright gives first-generation authors so 
much more than that to which they are morally entitled, and takes from the public (including 
second-generation authors) liberties to which the public is morally entitled, the system as a 
whole should "pay back" to the public what it has lost, a payment that should come out of the 
copyright's "extra-moral" revenues. This kind of analysis makes social welfare part of a correc-
tive-justice analysis; copyright must serve the public to repay it for its loss of natural liberty. See 
Gordon, 102 Yale L J at 1608--09 (cited in note 10). 
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There is no reciprocity between a publisher or author on one side and, 
on the other, an heir or testamentary trustee such as SunTrust Bank. 
While publishers and authors may grant permissions in the hope of 
obtaining future reciprocity, neither a bank nor a non-artist heir is 
likely to need a liberty of allusion. The duties of heirs and executors 
are also likely to make them more protective of their decedent's nar-
rowly defined self-interest than the deceased authors themselves 
would have been. As one cannot argue with the dead, heirs may feel it 
necessary to protect the dead even where the dead themselves may 
have been generous."0 
Gift suggests reciprocity, but intergenerational gift suggests an-
other mode of payment: gift from the prior generation to the present, 
and the present generation to the future. Ordinary gift is a circle: do-
nor gives to donee, and later the donee reciprocates by giving to do-
nor. Intergenerational gift does not involve exact reciprocation, but it 
has deep roots in property traditions, and perhaps in our instincts. 
Carol Rose calls on it in regard to the environment: a "combination of 
respect for the thing itself, together with care for other users, is what it 
means to have a 'gift' that comes to us from beyond our control-a 
gift that we pass along as yet another gift to those who follow.""' 
Moreover, when we are speaking of artistic creation, the early genera-
tions would not necessarily lose thereby. They had a freedom to copy 
their surroundings that copyright seeks to deny to their successors."2 
Disney copies from folk tales; perhaps current law should not prohibit 
folk from copying from Disney. 
Whether prior work is shared voluntarily or not, the person free 
of copyright obligations receives what feels like a gift. The way the 
sensation of receipt operates in the receiver's psyche is much debated. 
On one side stands the optimistic view of gift, epitomized by Lewis 
Hyde. He argues that the sensations stirred in an artist by an existing 
artwork create a fecund gratitude out of which new work arises." On 
the other side stands the dark view of gift, one that emphasizes the re-
sentment to which gift can give rise and the relations of unequal status 
that it can enforce. Exemplars here include Derrida, ... Rzepka,"~ and 
40 Paul Saint-Amour intriguingly suggests that post-mortem copyright can serve as a form 
of mourning, often unhealthily extended. See Saint-Amour, The Copywrights at 121-58, 199-220 
(cited in note 32). 
41 Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24 
Envir L 1,31 (1994). 
42 For ·further development, see the discussion of intergenerational equity in Gordon, 102 
Yale L J at 1577-78 (cited in note 10), and Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to 
Fair Use, 55 L & Contemp Probs 93, 103 (1992). 
43 Hyde, The Gift at 47 (cited in note 2). 
44 Jacques Derrida, Given Time 13-14 (Chicago 1974) (Peggy Kamuf, trans) (showing how 
gifts can impose debt obligations). 
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Bloom .... In either the light or the dark view, when a prior work is ex-
perienced, something emotional can occur. Copyright, by requiring 
monetary payment, may reduce the felt need to make an emotional 
payment. 
Predecessor art is not the only source of the sense of receipt and 
gratitude, nor of receipt and anxiety. But it is one source, and like the 
other sources, must be respected. The artist does not always have a 
choice about what he is given, what seizes him. It is bad enough, as 
Vincent Van Gogh once wrote, when an artist "is inwardly consumed 
by a great longing for action" but feels "as it were imprisoned in some 
cage, because he does not possess what he needs to become produc-
tive."47 Emotional shackles may be unavoidable. We must be wary of 
the additional inhibitions that the law may impose. 
III. CAN INSTITUTIONAL RE-ENGINEERING OF LEGAL REMEDIES 
MAKE IT EASIER TO SATISFY THE PROVISO? 
Most of the world's use is neither purely instrumentalist nor 
purely transformative. What to do? Full copyright enforcement could 
harm the utilizer, but free use could harm the laborer. In such cases, 
the proviso that the laborer leave "enough, and as good" is violated. 
There seems to be no way to avoid harm. Refrain from enforcement, 
and the laborer/author is harmed. Enforce a copyright, and the user is 
harmed. 
Faced with this dilemma, several commentators (including me) 
have suggested crafting a copyright remedy that would avoid the 
worst harm to the user: denying an injunction, and awarding the copy-
right owner only a right to an allocable share of the user's profits"' or 
an award of damages or reasonable royalty." A money-only remedy 
holds out the possibility of transforming a user with mixed status into 
45 Charles J. Rzepka, Sacramental Commodities: Gift, Text, and the Sublime in De Quincey 
52-58, 295-98 (Massachusetts 1995). 
46 Bloom writes: 
Weaker talents idealize; figures of capable imagination appropriate for themselves. But 
nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves the immense anxieties of indebt-
edness, for what strong maker desires the realization that he has failed to create himself? 
Bloom, Anxiety of Influence at 5 (cited in note 2). 
41 Vincent Van Gogh, Letter to Theo Van Gogh (1880), in 1 The Complete Letters of Vin-
cent Van Gogh 198 (New York Graphic Society 1959). 
48 In earlier work I have suggested that if such persons earn a net profit, then perhaps the 
law should impose on them a duty to give a share of those profits to the predecessor author. See 
Gordon, Excuse and Justification at 169 n 57, 188-92 (cited in note 28). A similar position, more 
fully articulated and recommended with less doubt, appears in Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112YaleL11 (2002). 
49 See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Col um L Rev 1600, 1622-24 (1982) 
(exploring judicially imposed licenses). 
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one who, like an instrumentalist, would not be harmed by the laborer's 
assertion of right. Even the Supreme Court has suggested an openness 
to denying injunctive relief against expressive infringers:"' 
This apparently ideal solution, however, has difficulties of its own. 
The incentive issue is sometimes phrased as a mere issue of quantity: 
does sufficient payment flow to authors? But that is not the only issue; 
how money and permission come together with the work also mat-
ters." Markets are not just invisible conveyor belts that carry resources 
from one application to another; they change how resources are used. 
Adopting expanded monetary remedies has the potential for eroding 
the good effects of free receipt that otherwise might be experienced 
by potential defendants. Abjuring injunctions could also constrict the 
way that all authors (as potential plaintiffs) view their work. Copy-
right and its monetary market mechanisms can coexist with many but 
not all noneconomic norms governing art. 
We need to separate two areas in our minds. In one corner of the 
ring is the instrumentalist user who sees the work he uses as a com-
modity without emotional ties. Copyright deals well with him. In the 
rest of the ring, a myriad of other folks bustle about. We need to think 
separately about the different classes of alternative persons, and come 
up with new models. 
This is difficult in part because of one thing copyright does well 
for the noneconomic sphere. It gives authors control over how their 
work is used, rather than just a monetary payment. The more the law 
pushes authors toward seeing their work in a cash-only nexus, the 
more danger it poses of devaluing the work in the artists' own minds. 
Common observation suggests that intrinsic motivations tend to pro-
duce better work, at least in the highly skilled vocations, than extrinsic 
motivations." But extrinsic motives could increasingly displace intrin-
sic ones if an author is entitled only to a sum of money. Unfortunately, 
the way to achieve the more integrated mode of reward (that is, con-
trol rather than mere payment) is via injunction, which is problematic 
50 See Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 578 n 10 (1994) ("[C)ourts may also 
wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law ... are not always best served by auto-
matically granting injunctive relief.") (internal citations omitted). 
51 See, for example, Dan Ariely and Jose Silva, Payment Method Design: Psychological and 
Economic Aspects of Payments 2 (working paper Aug 20, 2002) (on file with author) ("Based on 
ideas from behavioral economics, we contend that the disutility of paying can be substantially in-
fluenced by the method of payment."); Yochai Benkler. Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Na-
ture of the Firm, 112 Yale L J 369 (2002); Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics 
of Open Source, 50 J lndust Econ 197 (2002) (outlining the motivations that drive free software 
developers). 
52 My claims are, I believe, verifiable by examining everyday life. Experimental data tends 
in the same direction, but is of course far from robust. For some of that data, see Theresa M. 
Amabile. Crea1ivity in Context: Upda1e to The Social Psychology of Creativity 149-52 (Westview 
1996) (analyzing the effects of evaluation on intrinsic motivations and creativity). 
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because injunctions are precisely what cause the most extreme free 
speech difficulties. 
There is much we can learn about the costs of replacing the in-
junctive option with expanded monetary recoveries.5' For example, 
empirical studies could examine the ways in which creators already 
dominated by compulsory or blanket licensing in one nation (for us, 
the composers of popular music"') may differ from similar creators in 
nations where such money-only reward has a smaller role. For now, I 
call only for a conceptual separation. We should conceptually render 
unto Caesar the concepts that are Caesar's, and then proceed to think 
constructively about the rest of the world. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
Research has commenced on how receiving money can dampen 
effort's and analogous issues need to be addressed in the artistic con-
text. The legal literature is filled with studies related to deterrence; the 
role of affirmative incentives needs concomitant attention. Even a 
neoclassical economist should admit that the emotional toll of pay-
ment is at minimum a kind of transaction cost that needs to be taken 
into account.56 Given the data that already exists, I suspect that we will 
find a wide range of contexts in which imposing on noninstrumental-
ists a duty to negotiate and pay for licenses generates on the whole 
more costs than benefits for society. If this is true (and if, as I argued 
above, there are no moral or economic arguments that would prima 
facie require imposing such duties) we might wish to operationalize 
the insight. But how? It would hardly be practicable to adopt a rule 
that said, "No liability against anyone who relates to the text nonin-
strumentally." Not only might too many instrumentalists erect a pre-
tense of noninstrumental motives (causing false positives), but too 
many noninstrumentalists might fear their situation may be misinter-
preted (causing chilling effects). More objective criteria must be 
sought. 
53 Research has already begun on the practicability of compulsory licenses. Among other 
difficulties, determining the appropriate amounts of payment can be daunting. See S.J. Liebowitz, 
Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory License (working paper Aug 
2003), online at http://www.utdallas.edu/-Iiebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf (visited Nov 15, 2003). 
54 Anyone can make a recording of a previously recorded song under compulsory license, 
see 17 USC § 111, and virtually all performance media and locales obtain blanket licenses from 
ASCAP and BMI. 
55 See, for example, Gneezy and Rustichini, 29 J Legal Stud at 14-15 (cited in note 3) (re-
porting that experimental subjects who received low compensation performed less well than sub-
jects to whom money was not mentioned). 
56 See Ariely and Silva, Payment Method Design (cited in note 51) (exploring different 
modes of payment, and finding a significant effect from ;<the pain of paying"). 
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A plausible substitute might be a rule such as this: a person who 
makes transformative use, in a context where the use is not ordinarily 
accompanied by pre-use negotiation or licensing, should be free of li-
ability. The making of a transformative use captures most of those who 
relate to the text for its own sake, and the requirement of noncom-
mercial context captures most of those whose artistic tasks would be 
distorted by the need to engage in advance negotiation. Such a rule 
would preserve copyright liability against entities like movie produc-
ers, who are already so immersed in commercial necessities that buy-
ing a copyright license is hardly likely to have any distorting impact. 
The proposed rule has some connection to existing doctrine. For 
example, portions of the copyright statute extend special liberties to 
users of copyrighted works in nonprofit or noncommercial settings." 
Further, in fair use cases, courts ask both whether the defendant's use 
is transformative and whether that use is part of the ordinary market 
to which the plaintiff can expect to license."' However, the perspective 
I suggest here puts more focus and importance on the defendant's or-
dinary expectations regarding market involvement. Given the lack of 
moral justification for rights asserted against noninstrumentalist users, 
I think it appropriate to shift the locus of perspective from plaintiffs to 
such defendants.'" 
Another area where research is needed is on the effect of deny-
ing injunctions but expanding the grant of monetary relief. For exam-
ple, although much useful work has inquired into workplace settings 
and incomplete contracting to see how and whether monetary pay-
ments either "crowd out" or supplement voluntary incentives,"" rela-
57 For example, the statute allows copyrighted music to be performed for free during most 
classroom sessions, see 17 USC § 110(1 )-(2), and grants the organizers of benefit concerts a con-
ditional liberty to have live singers and bands sing copyrighted musical works for free before 
paying audiences, so long as no payment or other compensation is made to the performers, pro-
moters, or organizers, see 17 USC§ 110( 4). 
58 "Only 'traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets' are to be considered 
[as weighing against a defendant] in this connection, and even the availability of an existing sys-
tem for collecting licensing fees will not be conclusive." Princeton University Press v Michigan 
Document Services, Inc, 99 F3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir 1996) (en bane), quoting American Geophysi-
cal Union v Texaco Inc, 60 F3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir 1994). In both these cases, photocopying was 
held not to be a fair use. One of the key findings against the defendant was that ready markets 
existed through which they could have received authorization or authorized copies. 
59 In actuality, the question I am asking is neutral: would a market exchange produce re-
sults less desirable than would a lack of payment? The expectations and behaviors of both par-
ties must be considered for that complex question to be answered. 
I have long argued that "market failure" can be a ground for fair use. What is argued here 
and in Excuse and Justification is that the conventional list of market imperfections does not ex-
haust the possibilities. Even where there are low transaction costs, perfect knowledge, and the 
rest, the mere existence of a monetary transaction can be costly. 
60 Many lawyers were introduced to the issue in William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, 
Sa/vars, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 
7 J Legal Stud 83 (1978) (suggesting that imposing a legal duty to aid might decrease intrinsic de-
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tively little research has focused on the arts.6' I share Margaret Jane 
Radin's skepticism about claims that any monetization will trigger the 
collapse of entire fields of emotional connection into cash calcula-
tion.62 Nevertheless, the law can transform persons' conceptions of 
themselves and others, and amidst the growth of liability rule solutions 
more work needs to be done on how such transformations erode in-
centives. My own suspicion is that in the end, the traditional all-or-
nothing choice between fair use and full liability is preferable to rou-
tinely awarding monetary remedies in copyright cases affected by the 
public interest. Not only might the switch to monetary remedies en-
courage a growth in pro-plaintiff doctrine (a growth that hardly needs 
any more fertilizer), but it also might undermine authors' emotional 
conception of their task. 
If after investigating these costs of commodification, monetary 
remedies remain the best way to proceed, I suspect that the most lim-
ited, "profit only" remedy will prove to generate the best mix of incen-
tives and liberties: allow defendants engaging in transformative, non-
commercial uses to keep the proceeds from their work (including a 
reasonable compensation for their own efforts and expenses), but 
make them liable for giving the owners of copied works an allocable 
share of any profit beyond that amount. Restitution law has long been 
conscious of the difference between monetary and nonmonetary 
benefits. Suits seeking monetary disgorgement have the possibility of 
returning everyone to the status quo, and are more favored by restitu-
tion law than are suits over other sorts of benefits (such as services 
rendered). Ordering disgorgement of the latter poses the danger of 
making the defendant worse off than before the interaction began. 
Imposing liability on a noncommercial and transformative user poses 
the same risk, and potentially without concomitant public benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
At the moment, copyright is stuck: apparently, its institutions 
cannot implement all applicable norms. That may be a permanent 
condition. But consider the parallel problem, decades ago, when the 
Supreme Court was forced to recognize that the "private law" cate-
gory of defamation law had implications for free speech. The Court 
did not respond by fully depriving public figures of the right to sue for 
sires to rescue). For an overview of experiments examining how explicit incentives can reduce 
rather than increase effort, see Fehr and Giichter, 14 J Econ Persp at 170--72 (cited in note 6). 
6 1 One exception is the work of Theresa Amabile and her colleagues, who have done nu-
merous experiments on the artistic production of children. See note 52. 
62 See Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 95-114 (Harvard 1996) (resisting the 
"domino" notion that allowing some commodification will inevitably lead to all things being 
commodified). 
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defamation. Rather it adopted a creative rule: that when making false 
statements regarding public figures, media would be liable- but only 
for malice or reckless disregard for the truth:' Similarly creative flexi-
bility is needed in copyright. I have suggested elsewhere that solutions 
may lie in abolishing the "subconscious copying rule,""' significantly 
broadening fair use;5 altering remedies,"" and requiring proof of spe-
cific intent in some copyright caseS.67 Another potential rule change, 
suggested here, is to eliminate or narrow the copyright owner's right 
to sue those borrowers who engage in transformative uses, and who 
(unlike movie makers) are not so immersed in the commercial sphere 
that their creative fuel would be dampened by requiring them to seek 
advance permissions. This Essay also suggests that the apparent bene-
fits of a pending change in remedial practice be reexamined; we may 
be better off with the traditional choice between full relief and free 
use than in a regime where courts routinely order compulsory licenses 
in copyright cases. 
This Essay urges that some of the behavioral expertise now ac-
cumulating be turned to the question of authorial productivity. One 
cannot deny the importance of money, but one should ask whether 
there might be something special about creative activity that requires 
the money to flow in a particular way. 
63 See New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279--80 (1964). The Court has so far declined 
to carry out such an innovation in copyright cases. In fact, back in 1985, the Court used such a 
caustic tone in so declining that one infers the Court viewed such treatment for copyright as a 
kind of reductio ad absurdum. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 
539, 555-60 (1985). Today, the Court probably would not take such a suggestion so lightly. 
64 See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and 
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U Chi L Rev 1009, 1028-32 (1990). 
65 One of my suggestions regarding fair use has been adopted in a kind of boomerang fash-
ion. In Fair Use as Market Failure, I argued that private users' making of exact copies could be 
fair use when such persons did not constitute a potential market that could practicably be ex-
ploited by the copyright owner. See Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1640 (cited in note 49). That 
suggestion has been turned on its head, to suggest that practicability should be the only limit on 
copyright's reach, and that all potential markets should be monopolized by a copyright owner. 
For a useful review of the literature, see Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Ap-
proach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J Intel Prop L 1 (1997). 
66 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification at 169 n 57, 188-92 (cited in note 28); Gordon, 82 
Colum L Rev at 1622-23 (cited in note 49). 
67 See Gordon, 57 U Chi L Rev at 1028-32 (cited in note 64). 
